Criminal Law Summaries
Aliens Indefinite Confinement Under 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(6)
Case: Zadvydas v. Davis
Issue: Whether 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(6), a provision permitting the United States Attorney General to detain a deportable alien beyond the 90-day period designated for final removal, authorizes indefinite confinement of that alien or limits such confinement to a reasonable duration.
Facts: Under 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(2), after entry of a final removal order deportable aliens must be held in custody for a period of 90 days while removal arrangements are made final with the accepting country. §1231(a)(6) provides that where removal arrangements cannot be finalized within the 90-day period, an alien ordered removed who is: (1) inadmissible, or (2) removable for violating status requirements, entry conditions, or the criminal law, or for reasons of security or foreign policy, or (3) determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the removal order, may be detained beyond the removal period and, if released, shall be subject to [certain] terms of supervision. Two permanent resident aliens subject to deportation for criminal convictions were detained past the 90-day period authorized for final removal under 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(2). They were detained under the authority of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).
Petitioner Kestutis Zadvydas was born in Lithuania to German parents, but later immigrated to the United States. He had a long criminal record involving drug crimes, attempted robbery, attempted burglary, and theft. Although Zadvydas was ordered deported, neither Lithuania nor Germany would admit him because Zadvydas was not a Lithuanian or German citizen. In 1995, after being held in custody for nearly a year while awaiting deportation, Zadvydas sought habeas review, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. In 1997, the District Court ordered Zadvydas released, determining that the Government would never effectuate his deportation, thereby rendering his detention both permanent and unconstitutional. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the District Courts decision, reasoning that no constitutional concerns would be implicated as long as deportation remained a possibility, the Government continued its good faith efforts to achieve removal, and Zadvydas detention was subject to periodic administrative review.
Petitioner Kim Ho Ma was a permanent resident alien with Cambodian citizenship. He was convicted of manslaughter for a gang-related shooting. Because the United States and Cambodia did not have a repatriation treaty, Ma could not be deported. After being detained beyond the 90-day period provided for in §1231(a)(2), Ma filed a petition for habeas review in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. The District Court ruled that Mas continued detention was unconstitutional unless the Government could show a realistic chance that Ma ultimately would be deported. Because Cambodia would not accept Ma without an effective repatriation treaty in place, the District Court determined that the Government could not make this showing. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision, concluding that the statute did not authorize detention for more than a reasonable time beyond the 90-day period authorized for removal.
Holding: 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(6) limits the post-removal-period confinement of a deportable alien to a period reasonably necessary to effectuate that aliens removal from the United States. The application of this limitation is fully reviewable by federal courts. [In order to limit the occasions when courts will need to make the difficult judgments better suited to the Executive, for the sake of uniform administration within the federal court system, and because the Court had reason to believe . . . that Congress previously doubted the constitutionality of detention for more than six months, the Court established a bright-line rule wherein a detention of more than six months beyond the 90-day statutory period will give rise to a presumption of unconstitutionality. After the six-month period has expired and the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must rebut that showing. For detention to remain reasonable as the period of confinement grows, what counts as the reasonably foreseeable future conversely would have to shrink.]
Reasoning: The Government contended that, because §1231(a)(6) does not expressly restrict the length of time during which an alien can be detained, no such limit exists. Citing the need to adhere to the principle of constitutional avoidance, however, the Court, through Justice Breyer, rejected the Governments argument. It is a cardinal principle of statutory interpretation . . . that when an Act of Congress raises a serious doubt as to its constitutionality, this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the questions may be avoided. The statute carries with it two equally plausible interpretations; a detention thereunder could extend indefinitely or be limited to a reasonable duration. Because Fifth Amendment Due Process concerns would result from permitting aliens to be indefinitely detained without the prospect of removal, the Court determined that §1231(a)(6) limits permissible confinements to a reasonable duration. (Government detention violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause unless it is ordered in a criminal proceeding with adequate procedural protections or in certain special and narrow non-punitive situations where a special justification, such as harm-threatening mental illness, outweighs an individuals constitutional interest in avoiding physical restraint.)
The Court found nothing in the history of the statute, which clearly demonstrates a congressional intent to authorize indefinite, perhaps permanent, detention. Contrary to the Governments contention, the use of the term may [may be detained beyond the detention period] in §1231(a)(6) does not bestow unlimited discretion upon the Attorney General to effectuate an unjustified continued detention without regard to constitutional rights. Further, that similar statutes require detention of criminal aliens during removal proceedings and during the 90-day removal period likewise is not dispositive. [T]he statute before us applies not only to terrorist and criminals, but also to ordinary visa violators. Moreover, unlike detention during removal proceedings and the 90-day removal period, post-removal-period detention has no obvious termination point.
The Court rejected the Governments argument that ensuring the appearance of aliens at future immigration proceedings and [p]reventing danger to the community were the goals of the statute. First, the Court determined that preventing flight was a weak justification where deportation was not realistically available. Where detentions goal (in this case removal) is no longer attainable, detention no longer bears a reasonable relationship to the original purpose for which the individual was detained. Second, the Governments interest in protecting the community is only legitimate in this context when applied to specially dangerous individuals. The provision here, however, applies broadly to aliens ordered removed for many and various reasons including tourist visa violations.
Relying on the Courts holding in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953), the Government argued that alien status itself permits indefinite detention. Specifically, because the alien has lost all rights to remain in the country, that alien no longer enjoys constitutional protection. Distinguishing between an alien who has effected an entry into the United States and one who has never been entered, the Court refused to accept the Governments reasoning. In Mezei, the alien in question never technically entered the United States, so that alien did not enjoy constitutional rights, which rights would prohibit indefinite detention without proper justification. The Court also noted that the choice . . . is not between imprisonment and the alien living at large, but rather between imprisonment and supervision under release conditions that may not be violated.
Finally, the Court rejected the Governments argument that permitting courts to disregard the wishes of the Executive Branch, by limiting the reach of §1231(a)(6), violates the separation of powers. The Court explained that courts can take appropriate account of Executive Branch expertise in immigration-related matters without abdicating their legal responsibility to review the lawfulness of an aliens continued detention.
Other Opinions: Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented, concluding that Mezei governed the case. Justice Scalia reasoned that an alien ordered removed from the United States enjoys no constitutional right to a supervised release. Indeed, once an aliens right to remain in the country has been extinguished by a final order of removal, that alien has no greater right to release in the country than an alien at the border seeking entry.
Justice Kennedy, joined by the Chief Justice, also dissented, arguing that §1231(a)(6) provides the Attorney General with express authority to detain removable aliens beyond the 90-day post-removal period. Criticizing the majority for misapplying the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, Justice Kennedy explained that the principle only permits the Court to choose between fairly possible statutory constructions. Where the clear language of the statute renders a construction no longer fairly possible, that construction cannot be a choice. That the majoritys construction runs contrary to the clear intent of Congress is confirmed by Congress purposeful omission of a reasonable duration requirement in enacting §1231(a)(6). In other immigration statutes, where Congress sought to condition continued confinement upon such a requirement, it expressly provided therefor.
The statute also protects against risk to the community, a risk that may even increase when repatriation negotiations conclude. Limiting the application of §1231(a)(6) seriously undermines the objective of the statute by allowing countries with whom the United States might have sensitive relations to force dangerous aliens upon us. In addition, removable aliens enjoy thorough, substantial removal safeguards, such as appellate review of the removal order and habeas review of the Attorney Generals waiver decision. Even after they have been finally determined removable, these aliens still are entitled to be free from arbitrary or capricious detention. But seeking to prevent deportable aliens from fleeing and endangering the community are not arbitrary or capricious objectives. As long as they receive periodic administrative review of their detentions which will account for any decrease in the risk of danger that they might pose to the community, these aliens are afforded due process of law.
Underlying Justice Kennedys dissent is a concern for separation of powers. Because courts applying the majoritys six-month rule will not be able to account for foreign relations considerations properly, Justice Kennedy concluded that the Court had impermissibly authorized a judicial usurpation of executive power. The six-month period selected, moreover, bears no particular relationship to how long it now takes to deport any group of aliens. Finally, the bright-line rule established by the majority will provide removable aliens with incentive to obstruct the Governments deportation attempts in an effort to extend their post-removal detention beyond the six-month period permitted.
Comment: The Court made clear that the sixth-month presumption would not result in the automatic release of every alien not removed by then. To the contrary, an alien may be held in confinement until it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. If the habeas court determines that removal is not reasonably foreseeable the court must hold continued detention unreasonable and unauthorized by statute. The aliens release, however, may and should be conditioned on any of the various forms of supervised release that are appropriate, and the alien may be returned to custody upon violation of any one of these conditions.