Criminal Law Summaries
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Habeas Corpus Validity of Prior Convictions Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
Case: Lackawanna County District Attorney v. Coss
Issue: Is federal post-conviction relief, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, available to a state prisoner when he challenges the current sentence he is serving on the ground that it was enhanced by an allegedly unconstitutional prior conviction for which the prisoner is no longer in custody?
Facts: In 1986, Petitioner Coss was convicted in Pennsylvania State Court for simple assault, institutional vandalism, and criminal mischief, and was sentenced to two consecutive prison terms of six months to one year. He did not file a direct appeal. In 1987, Coss challenged these convictions under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act, alleging that his counsel had been constitutionally ineffective. The state court, however, took no action on this petition and Coss served out his time.
In 1990, after his release, Coss was convicted again in Pennsylvania State Court, this time for aggravated assault. On direct appeal, he successfully challenged his 6-12 year sentence, on the basis of a possible inaccuracy in the pre-sentence report. On remand, Coss successfully challenged the new pre-sentence report which counted his 1986 misdemeanor convictions as separate offenses. The 1986 misdemeanor convictions were therefore counted by the sentencing judge as one misdemeanor offense and, under the Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines, did not affect Coss prior record score. Once a sentence range was chosen, however, the Court examined a number of factors prior to sentencing, including seriousness and nature of the crime involved here, the well being and protection of the people who live in the community, your criminal disposition, your prior criminal record, the possibility of your rehabilitation, and the testimony Ive heard. Considering these factors, the sentencing court concluded that Coss would continue to breach the law unless given a period of incarceration. The Court then reimposed a 6-12 year sentence.
Coss filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Under § 2254, a writ of habeas corpus is available to a person in custody pursuant to a State court verdict if that persons custody is in violation of the United States Constitution, laws, or treaties. Coss contended that his 1986 conviction was the product of ineffective assistance of counsel and thus was unconstitutional. Consequently, the sentencing courts consideration of that conviction, and its adverse affect on his 1990 sentence, was unconstitutional. The District Court held that the sentencing judge had referenced the 1986 convictions, and that therefore jurisdiction under §2254 could be properly exercised. The District Court, however, denied Coss petition for relief, holding that although Coss 1986 counsel had been ineffective, Coss had not been prejudiced at the time by the ineffectiveness. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Courts finding regarding § 2254 and 1986 counsels ineffectiveness, but found a reasonable probability that but for the ineffective assistance, Coss would not [in 1986] have been found guilty of assault. The Third Circuit remanded the case to the District Court, ordering the Commonwealth to either retry Coss 1986 offense or to resentence him for the 1990 assault without consideration to the 1986 offense.
Holding: [O]nce a state conviction is no longer open to direct or collateral attack in its own right because the defendant failed to pursue those remedies while they were available (or because the defendant did so unsuccessfully), the conviction may be regarded as conclusively valid . . . If that conviction is later used to enhance a criminal sentence, the defendant generally may not challenge the enhanced sentence through a petition under § 2254 on the ground that the prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained.
Reasoning: In Daniels v. United States, _____ U.S. ____ (2001) the Supreme Court held that if a prior conviction used to enhance a federal sentence is no longer open to direct or collateral attack in its own right because the defendant failed to pursue those remedies while they were available (or because the defendant did so unsuccessfully), then that defendant may not collaterally attack his prior conviction through a motion under [28 U.S.C. §] 2255. In the present case, decided the same day, the Court merely extended this holding to cover § 2254 petitions directed at enhanced state sentences.
The Court first determined that Coss met § 2254s in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court requirement through his challenge to the 1990 sentence (which he was serving) as enhanced by the allegedly invalid 1986 conviction. The Courts decision that Coss was not entitled to relief under § 2254, however, was grounded on considerations relating to the need for finality of convictions and ease of administration, because the first and most compelling interest is in the finality of convictions.
As stated in Daniels, once a conviction has been entered, vehicles for review are not available indefinitely and without limitation. A defendant may choose not to seek review of his conviction within the prescribed time. Or he may seek review and not prevail, either because he did not comply with procedural rules or because he failed to prove a constitutional violation. In each of these situations, the defendants conviction becomes final and the State that secured the conviction obtains a strong interest in preserving the integrity of the judgment.
An additional concern is the ease of administration of challenges to expired state convictions. Federal Courts sitting in habeas jurisdiction must consult state court records and transcripts to ensure that challenged convictions were obtained in a manner consistent with constitutional demands. As time passes . . . the likelihood that trial records will be retained by the local courts and will be accessible for review diminishes substantially.
The Court recognized an exception to its general rule, for § 2254 petitions that challenge an enhanced sentence on the basis that the prior conviction used to enhance the sentence was obtained where there was a failure to appoint counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment as set forth in Gideon v. Wainright, 372 US 335 (1963). Other exceptions could also be available, such as a state courts refusal, without justification, to rule on a properly presented constitutional claim.
The Court, however, was not required to resolve the issue of whether Coss state habeas claim was ignored through no fault of his own. The Court concluded that Coss did not qualify to have his § 2254 petition reviewed because any consideration the sentencing court may have given to the 1986 conviction when reimposing Coss sentence did not actually affect that sentence. In choosing the sentence, the sentencing court considered many factors, including Coss prior criminal record. While it is true that the sentencing court technically considered the 1986 convictions, as they were part of Coss criminal record, it is a different thing entirely to say that the 1986 conviction actually increased the length of the sentence. The sentencing courts consideration was obviously not limited to Coss criminal conduct in 1986, but Coss extensive and violent criminal record as a whole. The Court concluded that the 1986 conviction was such a minor component of Coss record that the sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence had the 1986 conviction been omitted from the record.
Other Opinions: Justice Souter reiterated his dissent in Daniels, adding as another ground the Pennsylvania State Courts failure to act upon Coss 1987 state habeas challenge to his 1986 conviction. Through the lower courts inaction, Coss ability to challenge his 1986 conviction has proven to be a mirage. Souter also objected to the Courts finding that the 1986 conviction had not affected the 1990 sentence, because the lower courts holding to the contrary had not been challenged and thus was not before the Court. In holding the District Courts finding to be clearly erroneous, the majority is thus ruling on a matter in the first instance in derogation of this Courts proper role as a Court of review.
Justice Breyer also dissented. Because the State failed to argue before the Court that the sentencing courts consideration of respondents 1986 convictions was harmless, Breyer would not have overturned the Third Circuits finding that respondents sentence was enhanced based on the purportedly defective 1986 convictions. Breyer would have also vacated and remanded the Third Circuit decision because that court had not focused on whether the [§] 2254 proceeding was the first and only forum available for review of [Coss] prior conviction[s]. Since respondent had not shown that he was denied a forum in which to raise his ineffective assistance claim, any discussion of a constitutionally based exception is premature.
Comment: This unexceptionable opinion is consistent with the Court's recent attempts to bring some finality to federal post-conviction collateral review.